Protestant Missions in Anatolia during the Late Ottoman Period

September 27, 2006

I. The 19th Missionary

Missionaries, like all human beings, are prisoners of their own culture, and 19th century American and British missionaries to Anatolia were no exception. What molded their thinking and behavior, and what was the context in which they found themselves?

1. Problems are solveable, “underdeveloped” people can be “developed”

The Enlightenment concept that all people could become “reasonable human beings” and that all problems were, in principle, solvable became a source of great missionary optimism. This nurtured the notion that “undeveloped” people could be nurtured to abandon their “backward” state and progress to “modernism” (Bosch 1991:265).

2. Education was the way forward

Both the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission, which pioneered Protestant missions to the Middle East and, later, the Presbyterians believed that the spread of “Christian knowledge” through education was fundamental toward achieving the desired reforms. As a result the Board built an extensive network of schools in order to “create the conditions for preaching the gospel” by introducing a higher culture which would, it was hoped, “facilitate the acceptance of the higher religion—Christianity” (1991:297).

3. Ango-Saxon Protestantism > cultural superiority > racial superiority

Startling scientific and technological advances during the 19th century enabled western societies to establish themselves as master over all others in virtually every field of inquiry. This led Anglo-Saxon Protestantism to assume the divinely ordained superiority of their culture, a sentiment which gradually evolved into the conviction that God, in His providence, had chosen them, because of their unique qualities, to be the standard-bearers of His divine purposes (1991:299). As early as 1816 the Board described its objectives as “civilizing and Christianizing” (:296). It sought to enlist not only “Christians” but also “patriots” because “it was evident to all that American Christians were better equipped for the task than were others” (:300). It was the gospel which had made Western nations strong and great, and it would do the same for other nations (see, for instance, Annual Report 1876:xxii-xxiii). It would open the doors to the “abundant life” available in “Christian countries” which, according to Leslie Newbigin, was interpreted as “the abundance of the good things that modern education, healing and agriculture would provide for the deprived people of the world” (quoted in Bosch 1991:293).
In effect, the Protestant community, whether in Victorian Britain or 19th century America, made little attempt to differentiate between Western religious and cultural supremacy—what applied to one belonged axiomatically to the other. It did not make a clear distinguishing between culture and its religion (1991:291-292).

The notion that Christianity would lead to civilization was reinforced by post-millennialism, the dominant eschatological position in virtually all Anglo-Saxon Protestant denominations prior to World War I.

Unaware of the ‘pagan flaws’ in their own culture during this age of the ‘white man’s burden’ the white patrons saw themselves as the guardians of less-developed races whom they would gradually educate to maturity (:307-308).

4. Missionary Attitudes Towards Islam and Turks

A number of 19th and early 20th century missionary scholars, such as Pfander, Tisdall, Zwemer and Gairdner had a profound knowledge of Islam. Missionary scholars could, however, also exhibit profoundly anti-Islamic dispositions. Koelle, a missionary of long standing to the Ottoman Empire, writes in his substantial book, Mohammed and Mohammedanism Critically Examined (1888) that “Asiatic Islamism, that mysterious compound of a fanatical faith and iron tyranny, strove, with all its might, to cast Christianity from its political pinnacle and to rule the nations in its stead” (:458).

By far the most formidable adversary of Christianity, as a national institution and dominant political force in the world, is the politico-religious system ushered in by Mohammed. Mohammedanism stands forth in history as the great anti-Christian Power, the hereditary enemy of Christendom (1888:468 italics in original).

As for Mohammed, well, he was an Antichrist. “Islam historically has proved itself anti-Christian, because Mohammed personally was an Antichrist” (1888:469). An article in the missionary publication The Moslem World states that “it is as though all history means nothing to the Turk, or as if the progress of civilization stops before the religion, the philosophy, the fatalism of the Turk” (Anon MW 1916:56). The ABCFM missionary Henry Otis Dwight also expressed very low opinions of the intellectual abilities of ‘Mohammedans’ (Dwight 1901:49-51), pointing out that “it was an Asiatic to whom God once said ‘Thou fool’ (:161).

When missionary descriptions of Islam and Muslims are juxtaposed with the reports of secular travelers who did not see Islam as an enemy to defeated, one might think they were describing entirely different phenomena. For instance, the Board’s Annual Report of 1842 states that “Fanaticism is an essential element of the Mohammedan religion” (1842:105), while De Kay, an American who lived in Istanbul during the 1830s, observes that (Islam) counteracts and mitigates the severity of despotic governments…, (and) produces an equalizing effect, … (it) is in fact a sort of religious republicanism, only extending much further than in our country, where a difference of complexion is fatal. It ennobles all who profess it… (De Kay 1883:362).

The missionary community, by and large, seemed compelled to paint Islam in the worst possible colors to justify their endeavors and, possibly, to explain their lack of success. Islam was viewed as an enemy, an antagonist which needed to be defeated. This militant attitude shared the same boldness, aggressiveness, and spirit of conquest as the colonial venture. The missionary community was at war, and no good could be expected from the enemy (Gaudeul 1990:253). Unfortunately, the sense of “waging warfare” with Islam, and the resulting lovelessness towards Muslims, once again hounds the missionary community.

5. Inroads of Liberal Theological Trends > Social Renewal > Social Gospel

In the course of the 19th century many mainline churches began to abandon the supernatural aspects of Christianity. This further strengthened the notion of missions as “sharing the benefits of the American civilization and way of life with the deprived peoples of the world” (Bosch 1991:283). With respect to the Muslim world this reinforced the trend that mission should consist less of preaching—which got the missionary and his converts into nothing but trouble anyway—and more of “transformational activities”. Gradually the accent came to lie more on social involvement than on evangelism, “less on individual sin and more on society’s sinful structures” (:322). Salvation would come via Western techniques, expertise and culture. “Instead of the gospel, the mainline missionary enterprise ended up exporting the Enlightenment ‘isms’ which had impregnated the mainline churches: rationalism, evolutionism, pragmatism, secularism, and optimism” (:325). Though they did not start that way, the missionary community to the Ottoman Empire came, in the course of the 19th century, to focus predominantly on the establishment of a this-worldly millennium through its uncritical affirmation of American values and blessings, and the conviction that these had to be exported to and shared with people worldwide (cf. :284).

It is, therefore, little wonder that the missionary community focused on education and health, and welcomed any initiative which spread “European ideas among Musselmans”. The fact that the Ottoman Empire had a fairly extensive system of free public education in place by the 1870s (see Dwight 1901:216-221) which missionaries might have expected to subordinate their program to was not considered.

II. The Host Socio-Political and Cultural Framework

Upon arrival in the Ottoman Empire 19th century missionaries landed in an environment with its own unique dynamic. Let us, in broad strokes, paint the main features of the context in which they found themselves.

1. The Erosion of the Empire, Wars and Massacres

The industrialization of Europe led to a huge expansion of European trade, soon accompanied by increasing use of armed power beyond the confines of their continent. Both Egypt and Syria were drawn into the European economic orbit (Vander Werf 1977:99). Furthermore, as the Ottoman Empire, the “Sick Man of Europe” declined, various Christian ethnic groups, helped by European powers, revolted. Bessarabia was annexed by Russia in 1812, Greece became independent in 1832, and the French invaded Algeria in 1830. Serbia and Rumania gained their independence in 1878. Tunis was lost to France in 1881. Thrace was taken over by Greece that same year, and Egypt fell to British control in 1882. Armenian emigrants in various European countries formed secret societies to agitate, sometimes violently, for Armenian independence (Zürcher 2004:114).

Little wonder that anti-Christian feelings increased among the Turks. “Christian”, to the Turkish authorities, came to mean anything anti-Ottoman, anti-Turkish. They concluded that the Christian minorities in the Empire constituted a political danger, for “Christian” countries were all too ready to “protect” these minorities from their Muslim rulers (see “Capitulations” below). Indeed, at times missionaries did encourage the Christian millets towards independence without seeming to grasp the seditious nature of this encouragement (Blincoe 1998:110; Vander Werff 1977:99, 127).

2. Capitulations

Capitulations were privileges the Sultans granted to foreign nations exempting nationals of that country from certain taxes, and placing them under the authority of their consuls rather than that of local Ottoman authorities. The Capitulations also allowed those nations to protect certain categories of Ottoman subjects allegedly linked to the nations concerned. Thus France claimed the right to protect Roman Catholic and Uniate Christians, England the Protestants, and Russia Orthodox Christians.

The Capitulations created a symbiotic relationship between the missionary community and their own government’s representatives. In 1841 the Board’s Annual Report boasted how the mission enjoyed the “shield” of the American government (AR 1841:110). Conversely, western Protestant nations came to view their missionaries as allies. Little wonder: “what better agents of its cultural, political, and economic influence could a Western government hope to have than missionaries?” (Bosch 1991:304). The missionary community, by and large, welcomed western intervention; lobbying, in fact, would be raised to the level of “missionary method”. This identification with their own country would have dire consequences for the missionary enterprise throughout the Middle East as these countries, the one after the other, shed their foreign yokes.

3. Brief Period of Political Reform > Brief Attempt at Muslim Evangelism

During the Crimean War (1853-1856) Turkey was so dependent on French and British support that the Sultan was forced to grant more extensive freedom of religion. On the 18th of February, 1856, he issued the famous hatti humayoun, granting full religious liberty throughout the whole of Turkey which, for a period, opened the way for more extensive work among Muslims (Richter 1910:173). The missionary community, for the first time, hoped that it might reach Muslims directly (AR 1857:67 ).

Bibles were “sold openly in the courses of the mosques” and there were increased opportunities for witnesses and preaching to Turks and for Turks to have “friendly intercourse and connection with the missionaries” (1857:67 ). The “optimistic spike” lasted about eight years, after which there was a full-bodied reaction. A storm of hostility (1864-1866) squelched any further efforts at reaching Muslims. The reassertion of Turkish power after the Crimean War, the indecisive wavering of English and European powers, and the aggressiveness of Church Missionary Society (CMS) workers in Constantinople—notably Gotlieb Pfander’s insistence on publishing his book The Balance of Truth—brought violence to the Muslim converts in the city and made direct Muslim work very difficult. Furthermore, the massacres which took place outside of Istanbul a few years later dealt a nearly fatal blow to the American Board (Richter 1910:155-156). Missionaries became disinterested in reaching Muslims, as any movement in that direction appeared blocked as soon at it seemed to bear some fruit (:126).

After the revolt of the Young Turks (1908), new freedoms of press, speech and education were granted. Experienced American Board leaders like H. H. Jessup, however, observed the dark mood of mullahs and sheikhs and anticipated a struggle between Pan-Islamism and the new Republicanism. When the question of Muslim work was raised again in 1910 by enterprising individuals, the will to pursue it appeared lacking (Vander Werff 1977:124).

III. Missionary strategies

To obtain first-hand information the American Board sponsored a number of extensive explorations and surveys in the Ottoman Empire and Persia between 1818 and 1831. On the basis of the information thus garnered, what were the strategies and ministries which they developed in the hope of reaching the Muslim world?

1. Reach the Majority via the Minorities

As early as 1819 the idea was floated that the mission not target Muslims directly, but work among the Christian orthodox minorities instead (see AR 1819:230). In other words, the Greek Orthodox and the Armenian Gregorian churches were to be the object of missionary endeavors, not the Turkish/Kurdish Muslim majority (see Fisk MH Sept. 1827:267; MH April 1827:113). During a two month long conference held in Malta in 1828 the idea became offical policy: the most reasonable way to reach the Muslim majority, it was decided, was by reforming and reviving the Eastern churches (Vander Werff 1977:104). “It soon became evident that there was not (sic) hope of reaching the Moslems so long as the actual Christianity which they saw around them failed to command their respect. The first thing to be done was to attempt a reform of these old churches” (Clark AR 1878:xix; see also Green 1917:97 and Smith MH October 1833:386). The need to revive the Orthodox churches before ministering to Muslims was seen to be self-evident (Anon MH 1839:39-44).

The Board soon developed an extensive outreach, in terms of finance and personnel, to the Armenians and Nestorians while limiting their work among Muslims, a policy followed by most significant missionary enterprises which followed. From 1845 onward (with the exception of the earlier mentioned brief period in the wake of the Crimean War) the Board’s Annual Reports would speak of mission to the Armenians, Jews, Nestorians and to Syria, but not to Turks, Arabs or Muslims.

2. The Establishment of Educational Facilities

The Board’s primary ministry was in education. It developed an extensive network of schools which clearly favored the Christian minorities in general, and Protestant converts from Orthodoxy in particular. The scope of this educational enterprise is described in detail in the autobiographies of some of the key players, including Greene (1916) and Jessup (1910). The curriculum of the schools was, with the exception of “the principal languages spoken in Turkey”, typical of western educational institutions. It included English, mathematics, history, physics, biology, geology, botany, philosophy, Bible, psychology, and music (Greene 1916:166, 192). The simple fact that the high school curriculum included instruction in Armenian and, in the Balkans, Bulgarian (:186), and that much of the teaching staff were Christian minorities, was reason enough for the schools to be perceived as catering exclusively minorities. At Robert College (now Boğazici University) the curriculum followed the lines of American colleges. English was the language of instruction there (:204).

The number of those educated in the mission schools was significant, totaling well over 100,000 students; the enterprised also consumed the vast majority of the missionary budget and personnel (Vander Werff 1977:128). Graduates from the missionary-run American schools and colleges became the Middle East’s first generation of modern-style teachers, doctors, lawyers, bankers, merchants, authors, editors, interpreters and civil servants. These educated men and women, a large number of whom were Protestants “saved from” one of the Orthodox churches, sought to improve social and moral conditions by seeking to mold society into the Western image they had imbibed at school.

3. Medical Work

Like the educational enterprise, this ministry became a very substantial effort. The Board ran modern hospitals boasting electricity, surgical wards, outpatient clinics and dispensaries in Marsovan, Sivas, Mezereh (near Harput), Erzurum, Van, Diyarbakir, Mardin, Gaziantep, Adana, Talas, Konya, and Istanbul.

After the missionary community itself, it was, once again, the Christian minorities who received the bulk of the care and training (Greene 1916:147). I have found no record of medical work ever leading to a Muslim’s conversion to Christianity during the period.

4. The Formation of Missionary Compounds

The establishment of educational and medical facilities led to the growth of compounds, isolated Christian communities modeling a form of western Protestantism which might be envied, but which was in no way immitatable by the surrounding people.

Compounds tended to be built on hilltops outside cities (Greene 1916:211-212). One of the most beautiful such “vantage points” is that of Robert College (Bosphorus University), located “on one of the most conspicuous sites on the Bosphorus, where it will be, to all passers-by on that magnificent straight, an imposing monument of American Christian liberality” (AR 1870:15). These compounds could take on very quaint characteristics, totally out of character with the surrounding culture. The station at Marsovan, for instance, was described by a contemporary as “a walled village of another race, established in these surroundings by some unexplained cause… an old-fashioned village of a well-doing, friendly, hospitable people” (Childs 1917:52, 53).

One of the most enduring mission compounds in the Middle East was the “Bible House” in Istanbul. Built in 1872 with money raised in America, the large, five storied complex of buildings housed the offices of the American Bible Society, had large store-rooms for Bibles and mission books, and rooms for editors and translators of missionary books and periodicals, as well as residences for missionaries. It was later expanded to include a large printing establishment, a chapel that seated 250, and buildings and shops which were rented out to cover running costs. It was administered by a self-perpetuating board of trustees in New York, organized under the laws of the State of New York, with a local advisory committee selected annually by the board of trustees (Greene 1916:130). The great compound in the heart of the city, in other words, remained an entirely foreign affair.

Mission property came to be worth a fortune. “The property of American missions and foundations in Asia Minor, Syria and Constantinople runs to a value of many millions of dollars—even to millions of sterling, and is ever increasing” (Childs 1917:50).

5. Literature Production/Distribution

The Bible House became the literary center of the American board, as well as the headquarters of the American Bible Society. The Board turned out vast quantities of literature, both Christian and otherwise, in Armenian, Armeno-Turkish, Arabo-Turkish and Bulgarian. The notable exception was plain Turkish in the Ottoman script (see AR 1869:16-17). In all about 1000 titles and, in the period from 1831-1915 more than 4,000,000 copies of books other than the Bible were published along with 4 million copies of the Bible or parts thereof in various translations (Greene 1916:140). In 1855 the missionaries launched an Armenian weekly newspaper, Avedaper (“Bringer of Good News”). There is no record of a paper produced in Turkish for Turks. The editorship remained in the hands of American missionaries right up to 1911 and was subsidized throughout (:142,137).

There were a small number of Islamic scholars in the missionary community who sought to produce apologetic materials directed at Muslims. Some of their material was at a very high academic level; much of the apologetical material produced since then has, in fact, followed the lines of inquiry laid down by these 19th century Christian missionary scholars and orientalists.
The most famous of these missionary orientalists was, undoubtedly, the previously mentioned German Karl Gottlieb Pfander (1803-65). He originally wrote his magnum opus, The Balance of Truth (Mizan ul Haqq), in German in 1829 when he was 26. The book was translated into all the major languages of the Middle East and continues to be published today.

6. Courts and Lobbying

The missionaries’ own legal rights as well as those of the people they targeted became one of their great concerns. They sought to advance their cause both in the Ottoman courts and by enlisting their own governments’ support who, through the Capitulations, had been given certain rights over their “client peoples”. Lobbying, as noted earlier, thus became a missionary method.

There are numerous accounts of missionary efforts to secure their and/or their client’s “rights” as well as the security of their ministries (see Greene 1916:180,185). Lord Stratford Canning de Redcliff, the British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire during the middle of the 19th century was a particularly valuable ally (Richter 1910:113). In 1850 his lobbying resulted in an imperial firman granting legal status to the Protestants (of whom there were a mere 1007 at the time) as a new ecclesiastical and civic corporation (:113; see also Greene 1916:110). On another occasion the U.S. Navy was marshaled to support the missionary cause (1916:203) and, in the wake of the massacres of 1864, in which nearly all the American Board’s stations in Eastern Turkey suffered heavily and in which hundreds of churches and schools were destroyed, the American government was again called upon to put pressure on the Turkish authorities (Richter 1910:155).

When the Turkish government reacted to the publication of Pfander’s Balance of Truth by seizing the missionary printing presses, sealing the bookstore and closing down the Bible society, the missionary community, once again, turned to their governments. The bookstore was duly re-opened and the printing offices “were likewise released from the custody of the police” (AR 1864:62). When the Turkish authorities stalled on giving permission for the Turkish Bible to be printed, “the efforts of the English Ambassador and the American Minister… succeeded in obtaining an order from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which it is hoped will now secure it from the Bureau of the Press” (AR 1875:16).

7. Early attempts to target the Muslim majority directly

Although the overwhelming effort went into the establishment and maintenance of the missionary enterprise to the Christian community, several efforts sought to reach Muslims directly. This was particularly true when political circumstances were favorable for the missionaries, as they were during the Crimean War. Taking advantage of that opportunity the Anglican Church Missionary Society sent four missionaries to Turkey in 1858 to work among Muslims, one of whom was the famous Pfander. The effort, as seen above, was short-lived.
One of the most significant, albeit equally brief, institutional efforts to reach the Muslim majority was spearheaded by the Lutheran Orient Missionary Society (LOMS). Their small team first arrived in south-east Anatolia (Kurdistan) on September 6, 1911, and deliberately turned its back on the reaching Christian minorities (Blincoe 1998:139-140). As latecomers to the Middle East they had the advantage of observing and, hopefully, learning from, their predecessors.

From their arrival in 1911 until forced to leave in the early part of 1916, the missionaries had built up a Kurdish congregation, established an orphanage and medical dispensary. During part of 1915, the (LOM’s) Board was unable to reach the missionaries with the needed funds for the work, and when they were obliged to depart, Kurds supplied them with the funds needed for travel (Lohre 1918, quoted in Blincoe 1998:146). The orphanage, dispensary and church were destroyed during World War I.

IV. Response to the Missionary Enterprise

As early as 1832 outside observers questioned the wisdom of the missionaries’ strategy of focusing on the minorities (see De Kay 1883:500). Some missionaries noted danger signs around the same time (Schneider MH 1835:302). By 1842 there were more missionaries who were predicting failure

This sudden interest, so explicitly and so actively shown on the part of the Christian nations towards a tribe of people (the Nestorian tribes), who have almost solely prolonged their independent existence on account of their remote seclusion and comparative insignificance, has called them forth into a new importance in the eyes of the Mohammedans, and will undoubtedly be the first step to their overthrow (quoted in McDowall 1996:46).

Nevertheless, the Board held the course for another 45 years, only to have their hopes dashed (Greene 1916:157). What, then, did they achieve?

1. The Missionaries Split the Orthodox Churches

As seen, the missionaries originally wanted to revive the old Orthodox churches, not start a Protestant movement. In 1839, however, both the Armenian and Greek Orthodox patriarchs forbade contact with the missionaries, as well as the reading of books sold or distributed by them (AR 1878:xx). As of 1846 Armenians who maintained relations with the missionaries were excommunicated.

There were a number of reasons for this strong reaction, including the missionaries’ denigrating view that the members of the ancient churches weren’t “really Christian”, their “low” ecclesiology, their empowering of the laity, and the disappointing political benefits they brought with them (Blincoe 1998:34). As early as 1826, in fact, “open ‘warfare’ against the oriental churches was accepted mission policy”, and the oriental clergy were referred to as “the enemy” by the missionaries (Scudder 1998:28). After some twenty years of labor, the missionaries felt they had no choice but to organize a separate Protestant Church (Greene 1916:105,106). “The first evangelical church in Turkey was duly instituted in Constantinople on 1 July 1846, followed immediately by others at Nicodemia, Adabazar, and Trebizone” (AR 1878:xxi). As seen, the office of the British Ambassador, Lord Stratford Canning de Redcliff lobbied the Sultan to give Protestants legal status as a separate millet, and in 1850 a charter was signed by the Sultan, placing Protestants on the same basis as other Christian communities within his domain (AR 1878:xxi). The creation of a separate “Protestant Millet” would taint the word “Protestant” in the Turkish mind, leaving a negative impression which has lasted into modern times.
Occasionally a missionary or Protestant convert did become a zealous and courageous evangelist to Muslims, but for the vast majority the walls of prejudice and fear which had existed between the Christian and Muslim communities for over a millennium were too high to scale. In the end, the ‘evangelical’ churches did little more than the Catholic or Orthodox churches had done to confront Muslims with the claims of Christ (Blincoe 1998:193-194).

2. The Empowerment of Christian Minorities > Muslim majority felt threatened > massacres

The missionary empowerment of people who, up to that time, had managed to survive because they had kept a low profile, created tremendous frictions. The missionaries may not have seen themselves as representatives of an earthly power, but the Muslim tribes around them certainly did (Blincoe 1998:35), a perception re-enforced by the fact that the missionary community was quick to communicate their concerns about the abysmal treatment of the Christian minorities in Anatolia to their own embassies and politicians.

Local aghas were not the only ones who feared the empowerment of “their” minorities. The Sultan, whose empire was crumbling at the edges, also mistrusted the missionary community. The last thing he wanted was for his restive Christian Anatolian minorities and Arab provinces to become further educated in Western social values and political thought. And that, of course, was exactly what the missionary educational system was doing, along with the promotion, particularly among the Armenians and the Arabs, of their distinctive cultures.

The American contribution to Armenian and Arab nationalism was cultural, not political, but it was no less effective in making these persons less receptive to the Ottomanization desired… as a means of uniting the disparate subjects of the Sultan (Daniel 1970:111).

In short, this empowerment of minorities led to the missionaries’ being perceived by the Muslim majority as friends of the minorities, agents of western interests, and pawns of their own governments’ political agendas.

In Istanbul, Robert College was particularly effective in preparing non-Turkish people, particularly Bulgarians, for political life. Its Bulgarian graduates were to assume positions of influence as that country’s government leaders, majors, diplomats, cabinet ministers and educators (Stevens M & M 1988:406). Sir Edwin Pears noted that “I know of no other instance in history where a single institution has so powerfully affected the life of a nation as Robert College has affected the life of Bulgaria” (quoted in 1988:405), while the British journalist and editor W.T. Stead states starkly that “Robert College made Bulgaria” (quoted in :405). There was another side to this “success”: “As for Robert College, the Bulgarian Affair ended whatever influence it might have had with the Turkish government for decades to come. No more Turkish students attended the college until after the turn of the century. Even today, in the eyes of many Turks, the college is considered the prime mover behind the loss of the Bulgarian provinces” (1988:406).

The empowerment of the minorities was a mistake with dreadful consequences. The missionaries’ empowerment of Christian minorties not only failed in terms of evangelizing the Muslim majority, a case can be made that it was a factor in a series of massacres which culminated in the 1915-1916 genocide (see Joseph 1961:49; Van Bruinessen 1992:203). The missionaries seemed not to have comprehended their role in these nasty affairs, placing all the blame on the “unreasoning” Turk for failing to appreciate the empowerment of the Armenian people (see, for instance, Greene 1916:160).

When their plan failed, the Board “had no Plan B”. By investing almost exclusively in the historical churches “they washed out any bridges they may have made to the Muslim majority” (Blincoe 1998:193).

3. The Response to Christian Apologetical Literature

19th century Protestantism’s bold challenge to Islam was Pfander’s The Balance of Truth. As it set the tone for so much of the apologetical literature and debate that followed, let us take a closer look at the response it evoked.

The book’s publication in Turkey was ill-timed, and consequently contributed to its own hostile reception. It ended up exacerbating the overall tension between the government and the missionary community (see Prime 1876:431-432). The Sultan, already suspicious, was personally disturbed by Pfander’s apologetics and polemics.

If a few Persian copies, which had come into the hands of Turks, had caused such a stir, it was to be expected that the Turkish translation of the work would be far more disturbing. Violent counter-publications against Pfander and his work were issued with the assistance of the government (Richter 1910:174; see also AR 1864:61-62).

In typical Enlightenment fashion, Pfander appealed to reason, yet he seemed unaware of developments in biblical criticism and theology in the West, something Muslims used to their advantage in their attacks on Christianity (Chapman 1996:102). The best and most widely known response to The Balance of Truth is Rahmatullah b. Khalil al-Hindi al-Kairanawi’s (1818-1891) Izhar ul-Haqq (The Revelation of Truth), written in 1864 or 1865, published in Constantinople in 1867 and translated and published in English in 1900. It is the first great classic of modern Muslim polemics.

Al-Hindi sought to combine traditional Muslim apologetics with new arguments drawn from “modern” Biblical studies. His book contains numerous purported “contradictions” in the Biblical text, 17 reasons for disbelieving why the Bible is inspired, various “proofs” of falsification and abrogation, refutations of the Trinity and the divinity of Christ, “proof” that the Qur’an is both miraculous and God’s word, and “proof” of Muhammed’s prophethood. The Izhar ul-Haqq has been reprinted many times, and continues to be published in numerous languages, including English, something which indicates a need in the Muslim community to defend their faith against the pervasive influence of European culture, which they consider to be Christian inspired. It has spawned a huge collection of anti-Christian polemics, and began a trend of Christian-Muslim dialogue/diatrade as a contest between two Scriptures.

4. Positive Responses

There is no disputing the fact that throughout the period there were Muslim individuals who converted to Protestantism, particularly during the period of relative freedom during the Crimean War. While the liberal climate lasted, some Muslims inquired openly about the Christian faith, many bought Bibles, and some actually converted and lived to tell the tale! Hard numbers are impossible to come by as only a few written testimonies from the period remain. In terms of percentage of population, the numbers were insignificant.

Writing in 1859 William Goodell mentions that more than twenty “Mussulmans” had been baptized in Constantinople (AR 1865:69). In 1875 a nephew of one of the pashas was a candidate for Christian baptism (Prime 1876:425-426). The Board’s Annual Report of 1860 notes that “At Diarbekir, on the Tigris, a Turk has declared himself a Christian; and in Kharpoot a captain in the army openly proclaims Christ crucified as the only Savior of men. Many Turks in the latter region purchase the New Testament, and some the whole Bible” (1860:62). That same report states that

Six converts from Mohammedanism have been baptized, during the years, at the capital. Of these one was an Imam, seventy years of age. Another is a young man, a near relative of one of the late highest ministers of Government. These transactions have taken place openly, with the knowledge of the Government, and without serious disturbances. The whole number of baptized adult converts from Mohammedanism, in Constantinople, is above fifteen (AR 1860:62).

The imam, Abdi Efendi, became a fervent evangelist. The Sultan’s private secretary, Mahmud Efendi, also converted. In the summer of 1864 another 10 adults were confirmed in their Christian faith. Between 1857-1877, at least fifty baptisms of Muslim background Christians took place (AR 1865:68). Missionaries in Anatolia also reported conversions and that no trouble had ensued (cf. Meyer 1986:49 & Vander Werff 1977:123). George Herrick of Bebek Seminary wrote, “Quite a number of Mohammedans have renounced Islam and become true Christians; many more are soberly inquiring after the truth; and many others are turning unsatisfied from a religion which cannot save, or wavering in a merely nominal devotion to Islamism” (Quoted by Vander Werff 1977:123).

Individual conversions also took place before and after that remarkable, albeit brief, period of freedom. The Annual Report of 1843 notes that “Individual Turks are occasionally found, who take an interest in the labors of the protestant missionaries, as directed against the image worship and intemperance of the degenerate Christians around them” (AR 1843:99).
Blincoe tells of the remarkable conversion and martyrdom of a certain Sheikh Baba, who was regarded as a holy man by many fellow Kurds. He was baptized and, as a result of his conversion, opened the villages under his control to missionary work. His conversion was reported to the Turks, and when he refused to deny Christ he was hung to a tree and left there until the birds had picked his body clean (Blincoe 1998:58). Richter tells of a Muhammed Shukri, born in 1861 and still living at the time of Richter’s writing in 1910, who was converted, changed his name to Johannes Awetaranian, and became a missionary for the German Orient Mission in Bulgaria (1910:161). Another convert from Islam, a certain Fetullah Keiffi Efendi, became an assistant in the newspaper publishing department of the American Board (Greene 1916:313).
Fossum, of the Lutheran Orient Mission, records that “In a certain village the first baptism stirred up a petty persecution, but nineteen more [baptisms] within a year were passed over with little adverse effect. And in another part of the mountains a young man after having given himself over to Christ brought one by one all the five members of his own immediate family and four more distant relatives. In both these cases the converts remained in their own villages going on with their ordinary occupations” (quoted in Blincoe 1998:142).

Greene tells about a young Muslim so struck by the person and atoning sacrifice of Jesus that he became a Christian. After being arrested and exiled twice he was sent to College in the United States. There he changed his name to Paul Newman. Paul, because he admired the apostle, Newman because he had become a new man in Christ (1916:63-65). Paul Newman eventually became an officer in the US army.

For several years a subsection called “the Mohammedans” appeared in the annual reports. By 1861, however, that section became rather short, noting that “disappointments and trials have attended the work among the Turks in Constantinople… The whole number baptized is twenty-three, in Constantinople. Some indications of an outbreak of persecution have at times appeared, but no serious acts of that character have occurred” (AR 1861:47). By the following year the section had disappeared.

In 1867, a Mr. Charles Tracy, an American Board missionary, wrote the following in a letter: “A born Mohammedan may profess Christianity in the capital and not lose his head. These are results. We are satisfied” (quoted in Greene 1916:213). The fact that “a born Mohammedan may profess Christianity in the capital and not lose his head” indicates that there were such individuals. That, in the light of everything written about the missionary effort thus far, seems remarkable. However, their numbers, in terms of percentage of population, were negligible, and no congregations of Muslims background believers were formed. Nevertheless, the fact that there were conversions seemed to hold out the hope that, one day, there might be a breakthrough.

Certainly the brief history of the LOMS in Kurdistan demonstrated that direct missionary work among Muslims, in spite of legal and social difficulties, was not only possible, but would bear fruit in a relatively short period of time. They were well received by the local Muslim Kurds who, as seen, dug into their own pockets at critical moments to keep the mission going.

V. What were/are the missiological implications?

Although there were individual conversions, no church of Muslim background Christians came into being. Before looking at some of the reasons why this was so, it is important to note that the common complaint that it was illegal to target Muslims was not true. During most of the period in question there were certainly strict legal constraints, parameters within which the missionary had to operate. However, these did not make the job impossible. The authorities prohibited public preaching, but they did not prevent private conversations, educational and medical efforts, the establishment of clubs and societies, or the sale of Scriptures (Vander Werff 1977:123). So why was there no real breakthrough? Could the strong anti-missionary attitudes which developed over time have been prevented?

1. Missionaries tied their cart to the wrong horses

The Board’s original concept of reaching the majority through the minorities was, of course, a delaying action and a shifting of responsibility. At no time did the Board concentrate on training its own missionaries in Islamics nor on procuring evangelists of Muslim background. Instead, they worked to strengthen the Armenian Evangelical Church, the Jacobite Evangelical Church, and the Assyrian Evangelical Church. It became a mission to Christians who hated Muslims. They had tied their cart to the wrong horse.

The first and most obvious lesson must be that missions to Muslims must directly target the intended people. It cannot be done by proxy, via ministry to other Eastern Christians. This is important because missionaries identify with those they minister to, to the point of absorbing their host culture’s attitudes toward neighboring peoples. Missionaries ministering to Christian minorities tended to have a low view of Muslims and their religion, something compounded by Western derision of Islam, and thus they were led to compare the worst in Islam with the best of the West. Interestingly, those few missionaries, such as the Lutherans, who ministered directly to Muslims were much more positive in their assessment. Although this fact became obvious during the course of the century, the American Board did not attempt to remedy the situation by, for instance, concentrating on training its own missionaries in Islamics (Vander Werff 1977:123).

But the issue went deeper than the failure to train missionaries in Islamics. Even such Islamists as Pfander were incapable of separating Western culture, perceived as equivalent to “Christendom”, from Christianity. Certain of the cultural superiority of Western Christendom, they were convinced that Islam would crumble under its weight. As Samuel Huntington points out, however, many indigenous cultures, including those of the Middle East, proved to be remarkably resilient (Huntington 1996:93-95). They were sufficiently turned off by major features of Western culture as to become careful about what they would accept and what they would reject. Dwight points out that the “moral deterioration” many Turks experienced when in prolonged contact with Westerners resulted in “the strengthening of the repulsion felt by Turks toward the West (1901:194-195). In other words, by indentifying Christianity so closely with Western culture the missionary tied his cart to another wrong horse, for Western civilization failed the missionary—as it was bound to do.

In the end, the missionaries disturbed such fragile peace, mutual understanding and harmony as there was among the various ethnic groups of the Ottoman Empire by focusing only on certain groups. They should have insisted on reaching all sectors of society equally. All elements in the population should either have remained at the same level of ignorance or else should have progressed together. But American schools had developed democratic ideals among the Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians and Christian Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, had given them modern ideas, aroused their initiative and equipped them with the tools of modern life, while the Turks had been left practically in their medieval state of mind (Ross, Fry & Sibley 1929:165).
It wasn’t until the turn of the century that some in the missionary community began to realize that the concepts “reason” and “Western civilization” were insufficiently solid missiological bases.

We must therefore turn sadly away from the hope that mere civilization is the redeeming force which will raise the people of this city (Constantinople) to the place of importance in the world which they might hold… The wise are hardened and made more bitter in their natural repulsion toward everything spoken to them as in the voice of the West (Dwight 1901:197).

The carnage of World War I would really drive the point home. Turkey, under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk, would, after that debacle, embrace western secularism while reacting strongly against Christianity in general and the missionary community in particular.

After the war missionaries—for a season—turned their back on the notion of Western cultural superiority. But by then the damage had been done. The sense of “cultural imperialism” which came into being prior to the Great War continues to be one of the primary sources of anti-Christian sentiment in the Islamic world.

2. The Clash of Apologetics

As we have seen, Pfander began a tradition of tit-for-tat attacks, arguments and polemics which raised important questions about the value of purely religious debate and the role of apologetics in Christian-Muslim dialogue.

First of all there is the question of whether religious debate can take place without addressing the many social and political issues (the culture clash issues) between the two communities. Secondly, there is the question of presuppositions. For instance, Pfander et al encouraged Muslims to think that Christians think of Scriptures in Muslim terms, when, in fact, the Bible is radically different from the Qur’an. Thus, by allowing themselves to be drawn into a comparison of competing Scriptures, the missionary makes it much more difficult for himself to explain the fundamental difference between the two faiths with respect to their understanding of God’s self-revelation to mankind. The difference, of course, is that Islam holds that God’s supreme revelation came in the form of a book, the Qur’an, while Christianity holds that God’s supreme revelation came in the form of His Son, Jesus Christ.

The work of Pfander and other like him, such as Tisdall, is still sometimes referred to by missionaries who consider religious polemic and debate a desirable method of evangelism. Recent examples are the late Ahmed Deedad’s verbal conflicts with the likes of the evangelical apologist Josh McDowel in which, once again, debating was used as a weapon, not as an instrument used to pursue mutual understanding.

3. There were converts!

There were converts! In spite of everything, converts were won throughout the period, particularly during those brief times when the socio-political climate was more liberal. There were just enough positive responses to keep the flame of hope alive. The venture was not an unmitigated failure! Although the response was greatest when political pressure was lightest, there were converts even at times and in areas where, humanly speaking, the social-political environment did not allow Muslims to respond positively to the Gospel of Christ. What drew these few into the Christian fold? They had one thing in common: “they were on a personal journey to find God. These few elect souls wanted to know God, and they had an extraordinary desire for the truth” (Blincoe 1998:203).

* * * * *

A few hardy missionaries survived the debacle of World War I and would try to develop a more contextualized approach along with an ecumenical concern for the world of Islam. That, however, takes us into a different era. Who knows, but that may even become the subject of another paper for, well, maybe next year’s conference… Suffice it to say at this point that the elimination of the Orthodox background Protestant Church in Anatolia during the 1915-1916 massacres meant that when missionaries eventually returned to the region during the second half of the 20th century, they were forced to target Muslims directly; the Orthodox distraction had been largely removed. This created a hugely different missionary dynamic in the Republic of Turkey from that which continued to exist in the Ottoman Empire’s former Arab provinces, where the Orthodox background Protestant church continues to aborb the bulk of missionary time and investment.

Bibliography
Reports and articles drawn from the Annual Reports (AR) of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission or from the Mission Herald (MH) magazine published during the period in question.

__________. “Object of the Missions to the Oriental Churches, and the Means of Prosecuting Them” The Missionary Herald: for the Year 1839. Vol. XXXV. Crocker and Brewster, Boston. The Missionary Herald, January 1839:39-44.

__________. “Report” First Ten Annual Reports of the American Board for Foreign Missions with Other Documents of the Board. Crocker and Brewster. Boston, 1819:210-251.

__________. “Misson to Syria” Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions presented at the Thirty-Second Annual Meeting. Crocker & Brewster. Boston, 1841:105-110.

__________. “Asia: Mission to Turkey” Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions presented at the Thirty-Third Annual Meeting. Crocker & Brewster. Boston, 1842:102-117.

__________. “Asia: Mission to Turkey” Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions presented at the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting. Crocker & Brewster. Boston, 1843:89-100.

__________. “Northern Armenian Mission” Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions presented at the Forty-Eighth Annual Meeting. Crocker & Brewster, Boston, 1857:56-68.

__________. “Northern Armenian Mission” Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions presented at the Meeting held at Philadephia, PA, October 4-7, T.R. Marvin and Son, Boston, 1859:47-61.

__________. “Mission to Western Turkey” Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions presented at the Meeting held at Cleveland, Ohio October 1-3. T.R. Marvin and Son, Boston, 1861:34-49.

__________. “Western Turkey” Fifty-Fourth Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions presented at the meeting held at Worcester, Mass, October 4-7, 1864. Marvin and Son, Boston, 1864:58-72.

___________. “Western Turkey Mission” Fifty-Fifth Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions presented at the meeting held at Chicago, Illinois, October 3-6, 1865. Marvin and Son, Boston, 1865;66-76.

__________. “The Armenian Mission” Fifty-Ninth Annual Report of the American Board for Foreign Missions presented at the meeting held at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 5-8, 1869. Riverside Press, Cambridge 1869:14-17

__________. “The Missions in Turkey: General View” Sixtieth Annual Report of the American Board for Foreign Missions presented at the meeting held at Brooklyn, New York, October 4-7. Riverside Press, Cambridge 1870:12-17.

__________. “Western Turkey” Sixtieth Annual Report of the American Board for Foreign Missions presented at the meeting held at Brooklyn, New York, October 4-7.. Riverside Press, Cambridge 1870:17-23.

__________. “Syria Mission” Sixtieth Annual Report of the American Board for Foreign Missions presented at the meeting held at Brooklyn, New York, October 4-7.. Riverside Press, Cambridge 1870:34-43.

__________. Annual Report 1876:xxii-xxiii.

__________. “The Gospel in the Ottoman Empire” The Sixty-Fifth Annual Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions presented at the meeting held at Chicago, Illinois, October 5-8, 1878. Riverside Press, Cambridge 1875:xvii-xxix.

Fisk, Mr. “Extracts from a letter of Mr. Fisk” Missionary Herald for the Year 1827, Vol. XXIII. Crocker and Brewster, Boston. The Missionary Herald, September 1827:267-268.

Schneider, “Extracts from the Journal of Mr. Schneider” Missionary Herald, Vol. XXXI, No. 8 August 1835:301-305.

Smith, Eli. “Present Attitude of Mohammedanism” Missionary Herald October 1833:386.

Other Sources

Anonymous. “Obstacles in the Way of Winning Muslims.” Evangelical Missions Quarterly 14:3 (July 1978): 178-83.

Antonius, George. The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement. Hamish Hamilton, Norwich, 1961.

Blincoe, Robert. Ethnic Realities and the Church: Lessons from Kurdistan. A history of Mission Work, 1668-1990. Presbyterian Center for Mission Studies. Pasadena, 1998.

Bosch, David. Transforming Missions. Orbis Books, New York, 2003.

Chapman, Colin. Islam and the West: Conflict, Co-existence or Conversion? Paternoster Press. Carlisle, 1998.

__________ Cross and Crescent: Responding to the Challenge of Islam. InterVarsity Press. Leicester, 1996.

Childs, W.J. Across Asia Minor on Foot. William Blackwood and Sons, New York. 1917.

Clark, Mr. “The Gospel in the Ottoman Empire” Sixty-Eight Annual Report of the American Board for Foreign Missions Presented at the meeting held at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 1, 1878. Riverside Press, Boston. 1878:xvii-xxviii.

De Kay, James Ellsworth. Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and 1832. J. & J. Harper, New York, 1883.

Dwight, Henry Otis. What is the Near East Mission? Revell. New York, 1913.

Gaudeul, J. M. Encounters & Clashes: Islam and Christianity in History, Vol. I and II. Pontificio Istituto di Studi Arabi e d’Islamistica. Rome, 2000.

Green, Joseph K. Leavening the Levant, The Pilgrim Press. Boston, 1916

Huntington, Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. Simon & Schuster. New York, 1996.

Jensen, J.A. and Oberg, Einer. The Messengers of God: The History of the Lutheran Orient Mission Society, Part I: 1910-1950. LOMS, Minneapolis, 1985.

Jessup, H.H. Fifty-three Years in Syria. Fleming H. Revell Company, New York, Chicago, London and Edinburgh, 1910.

Koelle, Mohammed & Mohammedanism Critically Examined. Rivinton’s. London, 1889.

McDowel, David. A Modern History of the Kurds. I.B. Taurus, London, 1996.

Meyer, Kraig. A Clash of Swords. Friends of Turkey, Grand Junction, CO. 1986.

Prime, E.D.G. Forty Years in the Turkish Empire: Memoirs of Rev. William Goodell, D.D. Robert Carter and Brothers. New York, 1876.

Richter, Julius. A History of Protestant Missions in the Near East. Oliphant & Ferrier. Edinburgh and London, 1910.

Ross, Fry, Sibley, The Near East and American Philanthropy. Columbia University Press, New York, 1929.

Scudder, Lewis R. The Arabian Mission’s Story: In Search of Abraham’s Other Son. Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, Michigan. 1998.

Van Bruinessen, Martin. Agha, Shaikh and State. Zed Books, London, 1992.

Vander Werf, Lyle L. Christian Mission to Muslims, The Record. Anglican and Reformed Approaches in India and the Near East. William Carey Library. South Pasadena, 1977.

Zürcher, Erik J. Turkey, A Modern History. I. B. Taurus. London, 2004.


Christianity: Goad or Pacifier?

September 26, 2006

The role of religion in the socio-political development (or lack thereof) of a particular region is an emotive issue. Prejudice readily dictates what evidence we choose to buttress our case. Yet choose we must for the amount of data is overwhelming. In this brief paper we will take note of Max Weber’s famous theory about Calvinisim, look at E. P. Thompson’s critical treatment of Methodism and close with a few comments on the parallels Crane Brinton draws between religious and secular political ideologies.

Weber held that Christianity unleashed a spirit of individualism which had a deep impact on the socio-political and economic development of the West. He noted that Calvinism in particular was a catalyst of rationalization—such countries as Germany, Spain and Italy, where Calvinism had little or no influence, lagged far behind in their over-all social development. Weber believed there was a connection.

His reasoning was as follows:[1] mankind chooses how it relates to the world. It can attempt to escape from it through asceticism, mysticism and/or contemplation, as in the more highly developed forms of Hinduism, Bhuddism and Monasticism. It can also try to accept the harsh cosmos as it is by trying to live in harmony with it through various rites, rules and magical practices, as in lower forms of Hinduism, Bhuddism, Taoism and Confucianism. According to Weber these traditions are diametrically opposed to the third alternative, the Judeo-Christian teaching of man being created to rule the world.

In the Judeo-Christian tradition the one God is always right and true; man has no recourse but to obey His commandments. Mysticism and magic, the manipulation of deity, are wasted efforts. As a result of man’s fall into sin, the world and all therein is sinful and incomplete, but God chose to use sinful man as a divine instrument in the reformation of creation. The world is not just full of sin and iniquity, it also contains the possibility of improvement. This created in Jews and Christians a drive toward controlling and improving the world, a drive particularly widespread in Calvinist circles.

Furthermore, the Bible condemned ritualism; it demanded adherence to God’s laws with all of one’s heart, soul and mind. This led Calvin to impose a disciplined lifestyle on the body of believers. Under him, the sanctified lifestyle previously exercised by monks in their cells became the expected norm for every believer in his interaction with society. The monk’s ausserweltliche Askese (asceticism with respect to the world at large) was replaced by the Calvinists’ innerweltliche Askese (inner asceticism), which was more than mere self-denial; it metamorphosed into sober, rational and deliberate efforts to improve the world instead of a desire to escape from it.[2]

Add to this Calvin’s doctrine of predestination, in which election takes place before death, and the social dimension of his teachings become clear. Sober, rational, deliberate action leading to wealth and success is an indication that a person is one of God’s chosen ones. This led to labor, previously denounced as a result of the fall, becoming a means of sanctification.

Lastly, Calvinism’s emphasis on the sinfulness of all men also had long-range effects. Firstly, it laid the basis for relatively democratic church structures–after all, the prince was essentially no better than the pauper. Secondly, spontaneous emotions and demonstrations of affection for others were viewed suspiciously as the possible deification of man. God sought to glorify Himself in man not so much through spontaneous bursts of love and affection as through a deliberate, disciplined struggle against sin, poverty and misery. Wealth had its dangers, but with it came the challenge of stewardship, and as such served ascetic purposes.

Personal initiative, a sober lifestyle and the drive to discover the divine laws which govern nature and society in order to redeem it, undermined the power of myths and magic in explaining the inexplicable. The free study of the Bible emancipated the individual from fixed ways of thinking and introduced more democratic church structures to boot.
In time this led to the modern, capitalist, bourgeois mentality which promoted the view that the enemy of being a good Christian was not wealth-creation but a luxurious lifestyle. Making money could, according to these “modern” Puritans, or English Calvinists, be to the honor and glory of God. “Hail to the man of wealth who has been found blameles.”[3] Although there were many in the Puritan camp who disagreed with this way of thinking, the concept that religion and doing business in a rational way were not incompatible grew steadily. Thus, as the historian R. H. Tawney puts it, “The individualism congenial to the world of business became the distinctive characteristic of Puritanism which had arrived, and which, in becoming a political force, was at once secularized and committed to a career of compromise. Its note was not to establish a ‘Kingdom of Christ’, but an ideal of personal character and conduct, to be realized by the punctual discharge both of public and private duties. Its theory had been discipline; its practical result was liberty.” [4]

An additional factor affected the outlook of the Puritans. They resented the fact that the State granted monopolies to its own inept noblemen while making Puritan businessmen pay higher taxes than the nobility. This created in them an anti-mercantilism, an increased individualism[5] and, because the Anglican Church moralized the State’s behavior, the longing for a dichotomy between economics and religion. Their secularized view of business removed such traditional brakes on the economy as collectivism and the collection of interest, which had made making loans very difficult, and rational economic decision-making very difficult. Thus in the course of the second half of the 17th century Puritanism became a progressive, bourgeoisie ideology in which a calculating mentality, personal ownership of goods, and a utilitarian outlook gained ground. By the 1660s the Puritan’s political role may have been over, but he continued as a social and political factor of import. In time his ideology would be exported by courtesy of the British Empire to the ends of the earth.

Weber and Tawney’s progressive views about Calvinism stand in stark contrast to those of E. P. Thompson on Methodism. Thompson feels that the Methodists served as “apologists for an authority”[6], were “guilty of complicity in… child labor by default, (and) weakened the poor from within by… fostering… the work-discipline of which the manufacturers stood in need”.[7] As such Methodism was an “ideological self-justification for the master manufacturers”[8], turning the laborer “into his own slave-driver”[9] and forging “the last links of… the chain rivetted upon the proletariat”[10]. It provided an “inner compulsion”[11] to the idea that the lower classes must be kept poor to keep them industrious. “Work was the cross from which our transformed industrial worker was hung”[12] and a manipulative clergy disciplined all deviant growths which might offend authority.[13] In lurid terms Thompson speaks of “psychic masturbation” and “sabbath orgasms”[14] and “despiritualized fury”[15], suggests that the wound in Christ’s side stirred sexual fantasies[16] and speaks darkly of espionage[17] and “religious terrorism”.[18] He then admits that his harsh indictments are baseless. “This (i.e., his 50 page theory of Methodism being a ‘Chiliasm of despair’) is not the customary reading of the period; and it is offered as an hypothesis, demanding closer investigation”[19].

It comes as a pleasant surprise to discover that Thompson’s verdict on the social and political impact of Methodism in the early 19th century isn’t all that bad. It “spoke for the poor because they were the poor[20] and its dogmas “softened… social relationships while its chapels “gave the laborers independence and self-respect”[21]. It’s activities and ministry offered “community to replace the older community patterns which were being displaced”[22] and contributed to the stability of the family and the home[23]. Methodists even got involved in working class politics. “They were rarely initiators, but were often to be found as devoted speakers and organizers.”[24] “Whole Methodist communities combined Methodism and Chartism.”[25] “Men like Ruston, Thornton and Hanson made a contribution to the Chartist movement it is impossible to overestimate.”[26]

As Thompson rightly points out, the factory system demanded a transformation of human nature. There was no getting around that because the process of industrialization was irreversible. If Methodism eased the transition, who are we to criticize it? If such concepts as frugality[27] and labor being a virtue[28] enabled some to improve their lot, is that not commendable? If Methodist Sunday Schools promoted reading, discouraged writing[29] and were preoccupied with the “moral rescue” of the children of the poor[30], wasn’t that was the norm at the time?[31]

Another valid point Thompson makes is the fact that, unlike Puritanism, Methodist theology was Armenian. In other words, the “saved” are in a state of “provisory election”; backsliders could “fall from grace” and lose their standing with God. There may very well have been an impermanence about the Methodist conversion experience which forced the believer to repeated emotional self-examination.[32] Although this might be considered poor psychology today, surely the desire for personal improvement, for “sanctification”, is commendable—it may even have diverted revolutionary tendencies!

Methodism was definitely not revolutionary. Was it “pre-political” in Hobsbawm’s sense? No, it was a-political, even if socially concerned Methodists did become involved in various movements of dissent. “Wesleyanism was politically conservative on the whole and not directed against a political and social system.”[33] It was, essentially, a religious awakening. Was it, then, “the opium of the masses”?[34] Maybe it was. There are occasions, however, when a dose of opium is just what is needed. If there is any truth to Thompson’s own suspicion that ¼ million[35] working class[36] Methodists inhibited revolution[37], then Britain is deeply indebted to the brothers John and Charles Wesley.

If Methodism was an a-political religious phenomena, what are we to make of the parallels between religion and secular political ideologies Crane Brinton sketches in his book The Anatomy of Revolution? Brinton suggests they share a “pattern of strong sentiments, moral aspiration, cosmic beliefs, ritualistic patterns”[38] and that both tend to enforce a strict moral in their respective quests for utopia[39]. Their rigid determinism (God for the Calvinist, nature and reason for the Jacobin, scientific materialism for the Marxist) turns the elect into “better fighters”[40] who believe, somewhat inconsistently, that they can affect the outcome of that which has been predetermined. This makes them ardent proselytizers[41]. (In fact, the modern Protestant missionary movement has, with notable exceptions, been the work of churches of Armenian persuasion.)

In make his point, Brinton goes to unfortunate extremes: he compares the Russian Secret police with Baptist and Presbyterian ministers[42], the Communist youth with the social activities of Protestant churches[43], and Puritans are equated with the terror of the French Revolution[44] and Robesspiere with Calvin[45]. Furthermore, his brush-strokes are much too broad when he suggests that opponents of the elect “are not just mistaken men or fools, they are ‘sinners’ who must be wiped out”.[46]

Part of the Brinton’s problem is his definition of religion as “the influence under which men work very hard and excitedly in common to achieve here or somewhere an ideal, a pattern of life not at the moment universal or even largely acquired.”[47] By that definition his parallels have validity. However, if the statement “Marxism as a ‘religion’ accomplished much, as a ‘scientific theory’ it would have gotten nowhere”[48] is true, might that not be because Marxism usurped religious practices for its own secular ends while dumping religious based morality? If that is the case, there are no parallels–only shallow, artificial, dangerous imitations.

As Brinton himself points out, Christianity bridges the gap “between this world and the next, the natural and the supernatural or divine… between what men are and have and what men want to be and want to have.”[49] “Revolutions have had to invent their gods” he concludes. Their faith doesn’t have the maturity of the old, nor the universalism, the consoling power, the wisdom of the ages… They are goads, not pacifiers.”[50] Christianity, on the other hand, is both goad and pacifier. Ideally, she is a humanizing influence in whatever society she takes root.

Bibliography
Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution. Vintage Books. New York, 1965.

Hans Righart, Ed., De Trage Revolutie: Over de wording van industriele samenlevingen. Boom/Open Universiteit. Amsterdam, 1991.

R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. John Murray. London, 1964.

E. P. Thompson, The making of the English Working Class. Vintage Books. New York, 1966.
Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion. Beacon Press. Boston, 1963.

[1] Explanation drawn from Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion. (Beacon Press, Boston, 1963). Ch. 2, 11 13 & 15.
[2] Ibid., p. 166.
[3] Ibid., p. 247.
[4] R.H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. John Murray, London. 1964, p. 234.
[5] Hans Righart, Ed., (De Trage Revolutie: Over de wording van industriele samenlevingen. Boom/Open Universiteit. Amsterdam) p. 123
[6] E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, (Vintage Books, New York, 1966) p. 350
[7] Ibid., p. 354-355
[8] Ibid., p. 355
[9] Ibid., p. 357
[10] Ibid., p. 365
[11] Ibid., p. 358
[12] Ibid., p. 369
[13] Ibid., p. 351
[14] Ibid., p. 368
[15] Ibid., p. 383
[16] Ibid., p. 371
[17] Ibid., p. 352
[18] Ibid., p. 378
[19] Ibid., p. 388.
[20] Ibid., p. 351
[21] Ibid., p. 397
[22] Ibid., p. 379
[23] Ibid., p. 380
[24] Ibid., p. 391
[25] Ibid., p. 394
[26] Ibid., p.399.
[27] Ibid., p. 359
[28] Ibid., p. 362
[29] Ibid., p. 354
[30] Ibid., p. 377
[31] Ibid., p. 378
[32] Ibid., p. 388
[33] Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, (Vintage Books, New York, 1965) p. 185
[34] Thompson, p. 380
[35] Ibid., p. 389
[36] Ibid., p. 351
[37] Ibid., p. 381
[38] Brinton, p. 183.
[39] Ibid., p. 186
[40] Ibid., p. 191
[41] Ibid., p. 194
[42] Ibid., p. 189
[43] Ibid., p. 194
[44] Ibid., p. 190, 191
[45] Ibid., p. 191
[46] Ibid., p. 194.
[47] Ibid., p. 184.
[48] Ibid., p. 183
[49] Ibid., p. 197
[50] Ibid., p. 197


The Demonization of Islam in America

September 26, 2006

The Middle East thrusts itself time and again onto our consciousness. At times the blows strike where it hurts: the oil-price shocks of the early 70s, the Iranian embassy debacle, Kuwait, bomb blasts in US embassies and military bases in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, East Africa and the World Trade Center in New York. A stream of unsettling media images disturbs our tranquillity: the region rocks with recurring political crises; it is run by hostile dictators and indolent monarchs who turn the oil tap on and off at whim; colorful graphs show a proliferation of conventional and non-conventional arms; pundits prophesy wars about water resources. The region’s culture and value system appears utterly incomprehensible, diametrically opposed ours: they embrace death, for us nothing is worth dying for. They force everyone into their sharia mold, we treasure the free inquiring mind. Khomeini vs Rushdie. Scenes of huge, self-flagellating crowds of bearded men with deep-set, glinting eyes and screaming women in purdah float across our TV screens. We are their “Great Satan”.

Did we win the Cold War to be embroiled in a spiral of conflicts, a “global intifada” issuing from the “Crescent of Crisis”?[1] A headline in the January 21, 1996, edition of the New York Times eloquently verbalized that fear: “The Red Menace is Gone. But Here’s Islam.”[2]
The notion that a standoff between Islam and the West has replaced the old Soviet-Western standoff was seized by a number of groups and pushed to such an extent that a rational discussion on the subject has virtually come to be perceived as being, somehow, unpatriotic. But is there any substance to the idea of an Islamic threat? Or is it a mirage, a Boorstinian pseudo-event, created to advance certain agendas? If so, who stands to gain by this demonization of Islam? Who supports them? What is their cumulative impact?

The Arab world is vast and varied, stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. It encompasses countless cultures, languages, political systems, and numerous non-Arab ethnic groups—Berbers, Druze, Kurds, Turcomans, Nubians, etc. In spite of their disparity, however, the vast majority of these people appear to share a common denominator: Islam. This fact has led certain scholars, notably Bernhard Lewis of Oxford and Samuel Huntington of Harvard, to postulate that religion lies at the root of the problems emanating from the region. Huntington predicts a clash between the inherently incompatible civilizations of Islam and the West, arguing that the source of the conflict lies in the contradictory natures of Islam and Christianity.[3] Although, as we shall see, this “clash of civilizations” paradigm is much too simplistic to explain the complex dynamic of change taking place in the Middle East today, it suits the agendas of certain groups to perfection.

By presenting Islam as a global threat which must be curbed, and Islamic cultures as inherently incapable of embracing such aspects of modernity as individual freedom, social tolerance, women’s rights, and democratic government,[4] they have created a terrifying specter easily exploitable for political or religious purposes.

Let us turn to the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the Christian Zionist movement as two examples of groups who embrace the “global intifadeh” myth: the first for hard, pragmatic political reasons, the second for certain theological ideas.

Israel, a democratic island living on a sliver of legally acquired and expropriated land, has sound reasons to feel intimidated. It has repeatedly fought for its survival. The expropriation of Palestinian land, the destruction numerous of Palestinian homes, the building of illegal settlements, the invasions of Lebanon, the regular bombings of Beirut, the grievances of the Palestinian diaspora, the deportation of members of Hamas, and a host of other grievances have generated much ill-will as well as a barrage of Arabic invective and hyperbole. The intifadeh is a recent, frightening memory. The next intifadeh, should it break out, will be much worse. It will not be fought by stone-throwing youths but by the armed Palestinian security apparatus. Little wonder that American Jews should muster all means at their disposal in their support of the little country.

That support is considerable, vastly disproportionate to the size of the American Jewish community. There are reasons for this. Though retaining their cultural identity, they have integrated fully into American society. Whether in politics, business, cultural life or the professions, American Jews have distinguished themselves, and often play leading roles in their respective fields. Furthermore, high Jewish turn-outs in elections, the demographic configuration of Jewish communities in key states, and the perceived relationship between Jewish voting patterns and a candidate’s policies on the Arab-Israeli conflict sensitizes political candidates to the wishes of their Jewish constituencies. The Jewish community also possesses a wide-spread grass-roots network which can tap into the community’s tremendous generosity when it comes to the causes it supports, notably Zionism and Israel.[5] One of the best know of these lobbies is AIPAC, the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee.

AIPAC’s influence is so pervasive that, in effect, it strangles American foreign policy with respect to the Middle East. According to Middle East International, for instance, Clinton received 60% of his campaign funds from Jews, and got 80% of their vote in 1992.[6] The American-Jewish community’s strength is compounded by the fact that there is virtually no Arab-American counterweight on the political scene. A convention of the Arab-American anti-Discrimination Committee recently managed to draw only one or two members of Congress for its four days of meetings, while AIPAC is regularly honored by the presence of more than 150 members from both houses, including President Clinton.[7]

AIPAC has formidable media allies. The New York Times, the New Republic, the Washington Post, Near East Report, and a host of other magazines and newspapers regularly demonize Islam in order to re-enforce the image of Israel as America’s sole reliable friend, the only bastion of reason and democracy in an irrational and frightening region upon whose sole natural resource, oil, we depend. But more about that later. Let us first cast a glance at that other pro-Israel, anti-Islamic pressure group, the Christian Zionist movement.

Israel has not failed to recognize the coalition between the pro-Israeli Jewish lobbies and the right-wing Christian Zionist movement. As long ago as 1980, the then Prime Minister of Israel, Menachim Begin, presented the Rev. Jerry Falwell with the Jabotinsky Award.[8] The award was well earned; after the Jewish lobby, the Christian Zionists are one of the most powerful forces preventing US administrations from approaching the Middle East problem evenhandedly. A full page advertisement in the January 27, 1992, edition of the Washington Times shows just how much influence the movement lays claim to: “Seventy Million Christians Urge President Bush to Approve Loan Guarantees for Israel.” Seventy million is a lot of votes.

Christian Zionism is a central plank in the evangelical right’s platform. Its proponents are organized into such assemblages and pressure groups as the International Christian Embassy of Jerusalem, Christians’ Israel Public Action Campaign, Friends of Jerusalem, and Bridges of Peace. Certain eschatological teachings motivates these groups to unswervingly support Israel and, conversely, to demonize Islam.

The eschatological foundations for Christian Zionism are confirmed by the Washington Times advertisement: “We deeply believe in the biblical, prophetic vision of the ingathering of exiles to Israel, a miracle we are now seeing fulfilled.” Rooted in “pre-millennialism”, it asserts that upon His second coming Christ will take up residence in the city of Jerusalem and reign over this physical world for a thousand years. A number or portentous signs, most notably the creation of a Jewish homeland, would precede this event. Based on various symbolic passages and a few verses which refer to the return of the Jews from their Babylonian exile, this doctrine was resurrected in the 19th century and has been embraced by much of North American Evangelicalism (though with notable exceptions). Consequently, the Balfour Declaration, the creation of the state of Israel and the recapture of Jerusalem in 1967 are all construed as the fulfillment of biblical prophecy, harbingers of the second coming of Christ. The rebuilding of the temple is perceived as another pre-requisite. In short, Christian Zionists see themselves as “speeding up Christ’s return” by supporting Israeli expansionism. Their fanatical support for Israel often translated into anti-Islamism. Not only is Islam deemed to be Christianity’s greatest missionary challenge today, it is also perceived as the devil’s instrument because it touches Israel, the “apple of God’s eye”.[9]

The Jewish lobby and the Christian Zionist movement have numerous supporters in Hollywood and the news media. Distorting the image of Islam and Arabs has, in fact, characterized American media for much of the 20th century. According to Professor Jack Shaheen of the University of Southern Illinois and author of The TV Arab, Hollywood has produced over 700 films whose contents vilify Islam and Arabs.[10] Feature films such as True Lies and Delta Force, for instance, present Muslims as evil and violent, dangerous gangsters whom the American hero has to kill in order to save the day.

A steady barrage of articles and features in the mainline press relentlessly attribute the aggression emanating from the Middle East as coming from Islam, because “that is what Islam is.”[11] Edward Said chronicles an endless array of books and articles disseminating malevolent slurs—pseudo-facts—about Islam. A scathing indictment of magazine and newspaper owners and their writers, the book is a virtual “Who’s Who” of the mainstream media. They include Morton Zuckerman, owner of The Atlantic and US News and World Report, Charles Krauthammer of the Washington Post, A.M. Rosenthal, Serge Schmemann, and Judith Miller of the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Wall Street Journal, CBS, ABC, and a host of press and TV personalities.

Take Martin Peretz, owner of The New Republic. He has, over the years, presented a thoroughly skewed view of Islam and Middle Eastern culture:
“Arab countries have no cultural disposition for scientific and industrial takeoff. Alas, these societies cannot make a brick, let alone a microchip… They are historically doomed to inferiority… This widening gap will produce deep, perhaps intractable resentment against Israel. And while it may not lead to war in the traditional sense, it may well produce more of what Israel has experienced over the past years: terror and ongoing riot.”[12]

Milton Viorst, contributor of numerous articles for the New Yorker, writes:
“Islam succeeded where Christianity failed in shackling man’s power of reasoning… a basic antagonism has come increasingly to characterize Islam.”[13]

Peter Rodman, a former National Security Council member, after acknowledging that he is “admittedly a non-expert” writes the following in the May 11, 1992, edition of the National Review: “Yet now the West finds itself challenged from the outside by a militant, atavistic force driven by a hatred of all Western political thought, harking back to age-old grievances against Christendom… the notion of co-existing peacefully is more our notion that theirs. Their rage is too great, as is the concrete threat of the nuclear, conventional and terrorist weapons it continues to marshal in the service of this rage.”[14]

The Media’s strategy is to portray both Islamic militancy and acts of legitimate resistance, whether in South Lebanon before the Israeli pullout, or in occupied Palestine, as a single phenomena heralding a global conflict between Islam and the West. Daniel Pipes, writing in the National Review, entitles his inflammatory article, “The Muslims Are Coming, The Muslims Are Coming!”[15] F. Ajami, entitles his September 7, 1998, US News and World Report article “Mr. Bin Laden’s Neighborhood”. This neighborhood encompasses Karachi, Lahore, Khartoum, Tripoli, Tehran, Kabul and Cairo![16] A Morton Zuckerman editorial in the same issue of US News & World entitled “It’s Time to Fight Back” states, “The marriage of religious fanaticism and advanced technology creates a potential worldwide threat. Everyone… is at risk… That we must act, and act now, should be clear—or else we will repeat the 1930s, when the virus of fascism stalked Europe. In the end the price that was paid was tragically so much higher than it would have been if the democracies had shed their illusions that they could temporize with evil.”[17]

As a result of such assaults Muslims, to many Americans, are all perceived as potential terrorists and fanatics. During the 1991 Gulf War, for instance, numerous Arab community leaders were victimized. There are various cases in which Muslim immigrants have been targeted for deportations on the basis of “secret evidence” purporting links to a “terrorist” organization without the FBI or the INS divulging the name of the suspect organization. Some immigrants, denied bail as national security threats, have sat in prison for over a year, with no trial date in sight.[18]

Of greater concern, however, is the fact that the three-fold pressure of lobbies like AIPAC, the Christian Zionist movement, and much of the mainline press has made Congress super-responsive to the perceived needs of Israel. In May 1989, for example, Secretary of State James Baker urged Israeli President Shamir to give up his dream of a Greater Israel, only to have 95 senators sign a letter expressing their support for Shamir’s efforts.[19] In May 1995, the Senate passed the Jerusalem Embassy Relocation Act, which transferred the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, something the Israeli government under Rabin neither expected nor requested![20] The Clinton administration has increased economic, military and technology transfers to Israel to their highest levels ever, and, most importantly, placed US diplomacy at Israel’s bidding. Since the beginning of the Clinton administration the US has cast its vote eight times at the UN on the Arab-Israeli conflict. On three occasions it vetoed Security Council resolutions which criticized Israeli policies in the occupied territories and East Jerusalem, and on four occasions it voted against General Assembly resolutions with the same purport. On the eighth occasion it abstained. In the General Assembly, the US’s sole partner on these issues, apart from Israel, was Micronesia.[21]

America’s posture as the “honest broker” in the Middle East has been a sham for decades. It took Ronald Reagan one week in office to declare, at his first press conference, that West Bank settlements were “not illegal”. This was a revolutionary departure from declared US policy since 1967. In 1982 there were about 20,000 Jewish settlers on the West Bank, today there are about 140,000, excluding East Jerusalem.[22] US aid to Israel is today is about $5500 per capita, to the Palestinian Authority it is $41.60 per capita.[23]

The campaign to distort Islam in the effort to drum up support for Israel has led to such a warped understanding about Muslims and the Middle East that efforts to supply a factual account of the unquestionably deplorable events emanating from the area are subconsciously negated by ingrained patterns of thinking. Let us, nevertheless, conclude with a few salient facts. Firstly, in the confrontations between Islam and the West, Islam is not a major factor. True, Islamic fundamentalist groups, sometimes sponsored by “rogue states” pursuing their own, non-Islamic agendas, vent their spleens by exploding bombs or hijacking aircraft. Lockerbie and the World Trade Center are cases in point. Nevertheless, radical, fundamentalist Muslims today are but a puny percentage of the billion or so Muslims living in dozens of countries, cultures, languages, and backgrounds. The underlying causes to existing tensions are not primarily theological, but political, economic, psychological, strategic and cultural in nature. The 1991 Gulf War demonstrated this: the response of Iran, Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and other Arab countries was clearly driven by pragmatism, not religion.

Secondly, political Islam threatens the established dictatorships of the Middle East and North Africa, not the West. Islam is much too fragmented, much too self-directed, to seriously threaten Western interests. As the fundamentalist Muslim intellectual, cleric, and former President of Sudan, Hasan al-Turabi, put it, “the recent Islamic awaking has little to do with confronting the West and much to do with the constructive regeneration of Islamic societies. Fighting the ‘Great Satan’ is not the Muslim world’s preoccupation”.[24]

Thirdly, the clash of cultures myth and the notion of global intifadeh fail to account for the diversity of Islam and Middle Eastern cultures. The region is too weak politically and economically, and too divided ethnically, to form a dangerous critical mass. By imposing a superficial unity on events taking place is such diverse contexts as Kashmir and Kosovo, Azerbaijan and Algeria, Lebanon and Libya, we have created a pseudo-demon. It has taken on a life of its own and imprisoned us, preventing us from grasping and grappling with the real issues tormenting the region.

 

Bibliography

Ajami, F. “Mr. Bin Laden’s Neighborhood.” US News & World Report, 7 September 1998.Bishara, Ghassan. “Why US Politicians Ignore Arab Interests.” Middle East International, 7 July 1995.

Hunter, Jane. “Arabs and Muslims in the US: Victims of Legal Discrimination.” Middle East International, 31 July 1998.

Huntington, Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1996.

Khalidi, Walid. “The American Factor in the Arab Israeli Conflict (I).” Middle East International, 16 January 1998.

________, “The American Factor in the Arab-Israeli Conflict (II).” Middle East International, 30 January 1998.

Krauthammer, Charles. “The New Crescent of Crisis: Global Intifada,” Washington Post, 16 February 1990.

Lewis, Berhard. Islam and the West. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

________, “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” Atlantic Monthly, 26 September 1990.

Monshipouri, Mahmood. “The West’s Modern Encounter with Islam: From Discourse to Reality.” Journal of Church & State, Winter 1998: INTERNET: http://britannica.com/bcom/magazine/article/0,5744,217271,00.html.Neff, Donald. “Clinton Places US Policy at Israel’s Bidding.” Middle East International, 31 March 1995.

Pikkert, Peter. “Christian Zionism: Evangelical Schizophrenia.” Middle East International, 4 December 1992.

Pipes, Daniel. “The Muslims are Coming, The Muslims are Coming!” National Review, November 1990.

Said, Edward. Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World. New York: Vintage Books, 1997.

Sciolino, Elaine. “The Red Menace is Gone. But Here’s Islam.” New York Times, 21 January, 1996.

Sidey, Ken. “For the Love of Zion.” Christianity Today, March 9, 1992.
Tash, Abdul Qader. “The West’s Clouded View of Arabs and Islam.” Arab News, June 22, 1997: INTERNET:
http://www.arab.net/arabview/articles/tash27html.Rodman, Peter. “Islam and Democracy.” National Review, May 11, 1992.

Zuckerman, Mortimer. “It’s Time to Fight Back.” US News & World Report, 7 September 1998.

[1] Charles Krauthammer, “The New Crescent of Crisis: Global Intifada,” Washington Post, (16 February 1990): A23
[2] Elaine Scioline, “The Red Menace is Gone. But Here’s Islam,” New York Times, (21 January, 1996): 41.
[3] Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1996): 212. See also Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” Atlantic Monthly 226 (September 1990): 22-49.
[4] Bernhard Lewis, Islam and the West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 136-137.
[5] Walid Khalidi, “The American Factor in the Arab Israeli Conflict,” Middle East International, (16 January 1998): p. 19.
[6] Donald Neff, “Clinton Places US Policy at Israel’s Bidding,” Middle East International, (31 March, 1995): 17.
[7] Ghassan Bishara, “Why US Politicians Ignore Arab Interests,” Middle East International, (7 July, 1995): 16-17.
[8] Ken Sidey, “For the Love of Zion,” Christianity Today (March 9, 1992): 47.
[9] “For whoever touches you (Israel) touches the apple of His (God’s) eye.” Zechariah 2:8 (NIV). For a fuller treatment of Christian Zionism see: Peter Pikkert, “Christian Zionism: Evangelical Schizophrenia,” Middle East International 439 (4 December, 1992): 20; also, Peter Pikkert’s Desecrated Lands, (Belleville, Ont: Essence Publishing, 1996) deals with the subject in historical novel format.
[10] Quoted by Dr. Abdul Qader Tash, “The West’s Clouded View of Arabs and Islam,” Arab News (June 22, 1997). INTERNET: http://www.arab.net/arabview/articles/tash27.html.
[11] Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World. (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), XXII.
[12] Martin Peretz, The New Republic (August 13, 1996). Quoted in Said, p. XXIV.
[13] Quoted in Said, p. XXV.
[14] Peter Rodman, “Islam and Democracy,” National Review (11 May 1992): 28.
[15] Daniel Pipes, “The Muslims are Coming, The Muslims are Coming!” National Review 42 (November 1990): 28.
[16] F. Ajami, “Mr. Bin Laden’s Neighborhood,” US News & World Report (7 September 1998): 26.
[17] Morton Zuckerman, “It’s Time to Fight Back,” US News & World Report (7 September 1998): 92.
[18] Jane Hunter, “Arabs and Muslims in the US: Victims of Legal Discrimination,” Middle East International 580 (31 July 1998): 19-21.
[19] Walid Khalidi, “The American Factor in the Arab-Israeli Conflict (I),” Middle East Internationa (16 January 1998): 19.
[20] Ibid., p. 19.
[21] Ibid., p. 16.
[22] Ibid., p 16.
[23] Walid Khalidi, “The American Factor in the Arab-Israeli Conflict (II),” Middle East International (30 January 1998): 17.
[24] Mahmood Monshipouri, “The West’s Modern Encounter with Islam: From Discourse to Reality,” Journal of Church & State, (Winter 1998) INTERNET: http://britannica.com/bcom/magazine/article/0,5744,217271,00.html


Life-Long Language Learning: It’s Always Too Soon to Quit

September 26, 2006

There are two common dangers students studying language on location overseas for professional reasons: 1) they experience such relief at having passed the necessary exams that they would like to celebrate by immediately getting rid of all language-learning materials. 2) Because they can now officially be involved in work or ministry they believe their language will develop further without any effort, OR 3) they are discouraged their level of language is not as high as they’d like and conclude they’ll not improve it further. they aim to work within the limits of their language ability.

Language learning is a lifelong marathon from which the vast majority of workers drop out way too soon—in fact, it’s always too soon to quit! As the church develops the need for workers to master the language becomes more even important, for it takes higher levels of language to train others than to do the teaching yourself.

Language learning can become one of the most satisfying things you will ever accomplish—if you perseverse long enough. So what can you do to stay engaged in the language and culture learning process?

I. Decide that language and culture learning will be on your mind all the time

You must have the mindset that you are never done with language acquisition/culture learning. It must be a high priority on-going process turning you into an ever more effective communicator. Build time into your weekly program for continued “formal learning”. How?

· Take further language courses if you have not mastered advanced grammatical structures. It is better to take the time to finish learning foundational grammar at this stage than to leave it until later on, when it will be much harder to get back into formal language study.

. Continue sessions with language helpers, or recruit 1 or 2 native speakers (close friends) who will take some responsibility to think of categories of things that you need to delve deeper into.
· Carry a notebook all the time.
· Schedule specific times for reading and tape work.

II. Start talking! Develop your conversation practice.

Language school is a great place to learn about the language, a lousy place to speak it. You will need to develop regular conversation practice once you are finished school. You will, hopefully, have made some national friends and know others well enough for an occasional chat.
· Look for clubs, interest groups, associations, choirs, etc. that you could join.
· Look for adult education courses in some subject you are interested in or for a person who would be willing to teach you some skill.
· Look for someone interested in learning some skill you have.
· Look for media resources or public libraries where you can borrow or rent videos and books.

Our reason for being here is all about getting to know people and spending time with them. It is therefore obvious that regular conversation with both believing and unbelieving nationals be an important part of both ministry and ongoing language development. Due to differences in personality types, however, some people find it difficult to do so. If you are a “2 or 3 friends” type of person rather than an extensively social one, spend regular time with those few friends. It is important for more sociable types to engage in conversations that are linguistically, academically and/or spiritually more challenging.

Being a good conversationalist is a skill. When meeting new people, the usual topics about country of origin, jobs, family, and impressions of the host country are likely to come up. However, as relationships develop, expect conversations to broaden. This means that your language level should get stretched and opportunities for sharing aspects of the gospel in the context of the subject under discussion will increase.

Learn what the major topics of conversation, the ‘news of the day’ is. Try talking about your earliest memories, the country/city/town/village you grew up in, places you have visited, (photo album), interesting people you have met, the changing world, things that you like/don’t like, a film you watched recently. When appropriate your Christian faith can be brought into conversations. An appropriate verse may be in order. As such memorizing key verses is a good idea, as is regular reading of the Bible in the national language. Learn Christian responses to key Islamic concepts such as “sevap”. Learn to tell stories and parables illustrating key Christian truths.

III. Unite language and culture learning more and more

At the beginning, language (articulation, expression, communication, comprehension, correctness) and culture (customs, values, social conduct) are separate foci. Stop seeing them as two separate things. What you investigate in language has cultural overtones—and you can’t investigate cultural issues without language. To do this you must be aware of what is going on in your host country and the rest of the world. Watch a soap opera, as well as the news on a regular basis. Read a newspaper. Some subjects are risky but more likely to lead to deeper discussions, e.g. current political events, involvement in wars, etc. One of the incentives for improving language is to develop the skill of contributing to such conversations in an appropriate way as well as being able to gently steer people to another topic when necessary!

Presumably you will have already learned some proverbs. Continue to learn more from people as well as from books. Get to know how and when they are used. Start a collection of idioms and sayings. Jokes and riddles lighten conversations when things get too heavy or stagnate.
Asking questions about cultural practices and beliefs is a good way to get to know people as well as developing conversation. Ask about body language. Use the Dumb-Smart Question technique (i.e., ask people questions about things you’ve worked out the answer to beforehand).

IV. Don’t let yourself get into an unbroken routine.

Determine to get into new arenas, new activities that will broaden your language and culture learning. Do one new or out-of-the-ordinary thing every month that has a language and culture focus.

Carry a notebook. Write down what you wish you could say, or things you should do. Note any new idioms and words to hear, or things you want to learn more about. Log the questions people ask so you can work out an extended answer later with you Language Helper, so that you’re not caught out a second time.

Try doing crossword puzzles. The simple ones are not as hard as you might think!

V. Broaden your reading

Reading in the target language is one of the best ways to reinforce grammar already learnt and increase vocabulary. As well as reading a favourite section of the newspaper, become familiar with well-known national literature heroes. Read, read, read. Underline or star things you don’t comprehend. Use a national language dictionary as well as non-English speaking nationals to explain things to you.

Start with simple comic books, graduate to Agatha Christie, then to slightly heavier translated western novels, and finally national authors. Study subjects of interest in the national language.

VI. Develop creative writing skills

Creative writing is usually one of the least liked aspects of language learning, and often the first thing put aside after the formal learning period is over. It is, however, important to be able to write letters, emails, Bible studies and sermons. Creative writing forces you to think (not a bad thing!) and put our thoughts into appropriate Turkish sentences. Try writing an article on a subject of your interest.

VII. Other tips

Try to have minimal involvement with other expatriates, particularly at the beginning. Your first associations will peg you; make sure they include nationals. Be extremely cautious about taking on an English Bible study or other ministry in English. If you want to sense the heartbeat of the people, you have to mingle with those at the core of the society, not those on the fringe. So don’t make commitments away from language learning, the long-range effects of which will keep you functioning at the periphery of the culture.

Be careful about making yourself self-sufficient. Becoming a part of the culture includes learning how to give and receive. Learn to ask for favors and how to receive from others. Learn how reciprocity functions. If you are perceived as self-sufficient you deprive people of an opportunity to fulfill one of the basic ingredients to friendship-making: the meeting of needs.

- Find out from those considered good language learners what they have found helpful.
- Investigate the possibility of living with a national family.

- Continue exploring. When did you last ride a random city bus to the end of the line?

- Plan a cultural event monthly—museum, festival, sports event, art exhibit, concert.

- Investigate joining a community club. Get involved in a sport or craft and learn the specialized terms.

- Beware of regular trips back home. Don’t welcome too many visitors from home either—both are a distraction.

- Buy and look at a newspaper daily, concentrating on 1 or 2 topics—e.g., sports, accidents, comics. Make reading the paper a project with your language helper.

- Record a news broadcast and go over it with your helper. Record people telling their favorite stories or childhood experiences.
- Learn phone calling and answering courtesy language. Practice by calling stores and asking what their hours are.

- Get the sermon topic and Bible passage from the pastor before Sunday, read it and look up key words ahead of time.

- Buy children’s books and have your language helper record them.

- Learn some Christian songs and choruses.

- Memorize a Bible verse a week. Start with shorter verses and work up to John 3:16. Learn simple statements to explain these verses.
- Memorize a proper prayer before meals, a simple prayer for a church service and a prayer for God’s blessing on a friend.
- Work out a monologue on how trusting God resulted in specific things taking place (e.g., specific answers to prayer).
- Work out your testimony with your helper (short version to be expanded later). Have him/her record it, then memorize it.
- Learn the kinship system and the degree of obligation connected with each.

Conclusion: You need maximum exposure to comprehensible input on an ongoing basis.


Islam (Submission) = Violence > Paradise?

September 26, 2006

All the brouhaha in the Islamic world with respect to the Pope’s undoubtedly tactless statements recently has, once again raise the question of the relationship between Islam and violence.

Everyone knows that much violence is perpetrated in the name of Islam. In the name of Islam terrorists carry on their vile deeds and numerous nation states blithely ignore basic human rights. Does Islam really regard Palestinian suicide bombers are martyrs who go straight to paradise? Is Seyyid Qutb, the “father” of the modern concept of jihad in Paradise? What about the 9/11 bombers? And what about Mullah Omer, whose Taliban regime was darker than anything existing in the Middle Ages? Are those Saudi authorities who command women to be stoned to death for infidelity going to Paradise? And what about the religious police there who club women they think are inapropriatly dressed, force everyone to pray at set times, and break up Christian house groups seeking to worship the triune God? What about those who killed a nun in Somalia in response to the Pope’s words, or those who burned Orthodox churches? What about the kid who killed a priest praying at the altar of his church in Trabson, Turkey?

For Muslims to simplistically point out that the etymoloby of the word “Islam” (submission) is the word “salaam” (peace) just isn’t good enough. Nor is it good enough for the Muslim world to wipe their hands from the problem by stating that “those who carry out such acts aren’t real Muslims”.

The Pope’s words may have been tactless, but let the Muslim community not prove them true…